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I. INTRODUCTION
In January 1982, the Montana Supreme Court crossed a signif-
icant threshold in employment law when it recognized an em-
ployer's liability for breach of an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Co. (Gates
I).1 This decision represented a major break from the old era of
* Mr. Schramm is Chief Legal Counsel for the Montana University System. B.A., 1966,
Valparaiso University; M.A., 1968, State University of N.Y. at Albany; Ph.D., 1972, New
York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University; J.D. 1977, William
Mitchell College of Law.
1. 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982). In 1983 this case was brought before the court
a second time. Gates v. Life of Montana Insur. Co., 205 Mont. 304, 668 P.2d 213 (1983)
[hereinafter Gates II]. The employment covenant of good faith and fair dealing had been
acknowledged earlier in dictum in Reiter v. Yellowstone County, - Mont. -, -, 627
1
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Montana employment law. The old era was dominated from early
statehood by the statutory presumption that employment was an
at-will relationship, which either party could end without cause
upon a moment's notice.2 The new era has already gone through
three major stages. First, from 1982 through 1985 the Montana Su-
preme Court steadily expanded the grounds on which a terminated
employee could sue.3 Second, starting in late 1985, the Montana
Supreme Court's decisions became much less predictable as the
court began to refine the broad policy pronouncements of the pre-
vious four years and to look for legal theories to moderate or re-
verse several of the consequences of Gates I and the cases that
followed. The third stage began in 1987, when the 1987 Montana
Legislature, reacting primarily to an employer backlash against the
court's new doctrines, enacted the "Wrongful Discharge From Em-
ployment Act" (WDFEA).4 WDFEA rejected a large part of the
case law since Gates I, but it also recognized that the statutory at-
will presumption left employees overly vulnerable in certain cir-
cumstances. In July 1989, the Montana Supreme Court upheld
WDFEA against a constitutional challenge in Meech v. Hillhaven
West, Inc.' Since the Meech court put its imprimatur on WDFEA,
most Montana employers, employees, and employment law practi-
tioners have abandoned the transitional case law of the 1980s. In-
stead, these groups have headed toward a new legal path, where
primary guidance comes no longer from case law, but rather, from
statutory citation and interpretation.
This article charts the still uncertain contours of this new era.
It first chronicles the development of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in Montana employment law, concentrating on
post-1985 modifications of early covenant rulings, and then com-
P.2d 845, 849 (1981).
2. The at-will section remains codified at Montana Code Annotated § 39-2-503 (1989).
3. This initial period of expansion of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing has
been examined in several articles. See Graham & Luck, The Continuing Development of the
Tort of Bad Faith in Montana, 45 MONT. L. REV. 43, 66-68 (1984); Hopkins & Robinson,
Employment At-Will, Wrongful Discharge, and the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing in Montana, Past, Present, and Future, 46 MONT. L. REv. 1 (1985); Comment, Sur-
vey: Good Faith and Fair Dealing: An Analysis of Recent Cases, 48 MONT. L. REV. 193
(1987) (authored by James Hubble). Because these articles cover the period up to 1985, this
article will focus primarily on developments since 1985.
4. SEE Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-901 to -914 (1989).
5. - Mont. -, 776 P.2d 488 (1989). The major contention of the plaintiff challeng-
ing WDFEA was that Gates I and the succeeding cases created a vested common-law rem-
edy that could not be reduced by the legislature because of the "full legal redress" provision
in article II, section 16 of the Montana Constitution. The court rejected this argument by
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pares that law to the new regime brought in with WDFEA.
II. THE ALTERNATING EXPANSION AND CONTRACTION OF
EMPLOYMENT TORT ACTIONS
A. Redefining the Employer Covenant of Good Faith
By the mid-1980s state supreme courts were well on their way
to rejecting the previously dominant presumption of at-will em-
ployment.6 Montana was in the forefront of this movement. The
Montana Supreme Court first implied a covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in employment contracts in Gates I.7 It then declared
the breach of the covenant a tort action rather than a contract ac-
tion in Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Co. (Gates II),'
thereby opening the door for punitive damages and a broader
range of consequential damages. One year later, the Montana Su-
preme Court held in Dare v. Montana Petroleum Marketing" that
an employee could base an enforceable covenant on an employer's
oral or unintended "objective manifestations" of job security to an
employee.10 Under the reasoning in Dare, an employer could create
an obligation not to terminate an employee except for good cause,
by giving that employee a positive performance appraisal or a sal-
ary increase, regardless of whether the employer intended to "ob-
jectively manifest" any assurances of job security. Finally, the
court extended the covenant to probationary employees in Cren-
shaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hospital."
Around the country some state courts required an employee
suing for breach of the covenant of fair dealing to show that the
employer violated a public policy in terminating the employee."2
6. For excellent summaries of those developments see Gradwohl, The Search For Poli-
cies On Protecting the Opportunity of an Individual To Earn A Livelihood Through Per-
formance of Personal Services, 67 NEB. L. REV. 1 (1988). This entire issue of the Nebraska
Law Review is devoted to articles on wrongful discharge. The several articles subsumed
under the broad volume title, taken together, give the reader a glimpse of the voluminous
legal literature of the 1980s spawned by the movement to undo the at-will doctrine. Authors
include Clyde B. Summers, William B. Gould IV, Theodore J. St. Antoine, and Jack Stieber.
No better survey can be found. See also Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of 100
Years of Employer Privilege, 21 IDAHO L. REV. 201 (1985).
7. 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1981). See also Nye v. Department of Livestock, 196
Mont. 222, 639 P.2d 498 (1982). Nye is the first successful suit for a wrongful discharge
action based on a violation of public policy. Such cases constitute a subset of covenant of
good faith and fair dealing cases. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
8. 205 Mont. 304, 307, 668 P.2d 213, 215 (1983).
9. 212 Mont. 274, 687 P.2d 1015 (1984).
10. Id. at 282, 687 P.2d at 1020.
11. 213 Mont. 488, 500-01, 693 P.2d 487, 493 (1984).
12. See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975), in which an employee
prevailed on a claim that she had been fired for insisting on serving as a juror.
3
Schramm: Montana Employment Law and the 1987 Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act: A New Order Begins
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1990
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE STATUTE
Others required a showing that the employer violated an oral or
implied contract with the employee."3 By 1985, the Montana Su-
preme Court had defined the covenant so broadly that it incorpo-
rated all extant theories. 4
The Montana Supreme Court first indicated its willingness to
rein in this expanding cause of action in a non-labor case. In Nich-
olson v. United Pacific Insurance,'s the court was confronted with
a dispute between two parties to a commercial contract. The court
expressly declined to imply a covenant of good faith into every
contract breach.16 In so doing, the court parted ways with Califor-
nia case law.1 7 The court explained this divergence by noting that,
in Montana, the focus is not so much on whether a contract has
been breached. Instead, the focus is on whether the contract has
been breached through especially egregious conduct.18 The court
then laid out a "justifiable expectations" standard for determining
whether a breach of contract was serious enough that it breached
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing: "The nature and ex-
tent of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is mea-
sured in a particular contract by the justifiable expectations of the
parties. Where one party acts arbitrarily, capriciously or unreason-
ably, that conduct exceeds the justifiable expectations of the sec-
ond party."' 9 Thus, while the "justifiable expectations" language in
Nicholson harked back to the "objective manifestations" standard
enunciated one year earlier in Dare, the "arbitrary, capricious, and
unreasonable" language, as applied in an employment case, ele-
vated the level of employer misconduct that a discharged employee
must show.
Some ten months later, in Maxwell v. Sisters of Charity of
13. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 292
N.W.2d 880 (1980), in which an employer's oral assurances made at the time of hiring, com-
bined with a personnel manual adopted after the employee's hire, created an implied obliga-
tion to terminate only for just cause.
14. The court attempted to define "wrongful discharge" and differentiate it from a
"breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing" in Dare. As Justice Morrison noted in his
dissenting opinion, this attempt to differentiate among varieties of employment discharge
actions could lead to confusion, because in practice the court had allowed the breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to swallow all varieties of discharge actions. Dare,
212 Mont. at 284-86, 687 P.2d at 1021-22 (Morrison, J., dissenting). This article uses the
term "breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing" in this broad sense. See infra note
76, for further discussion on this point.
15. 219 Mont. 32, 710 P.2d 1342 (1985).
16. Id. at 41, 710 P.2d at 1348.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 41-42, 710 P.2d at 1348.
1990]
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Providence of Montana,20 a federal district court made explicit
what had only been implied in Nicholson. Confronted with an em-
ployee's claim that he had been terminated in violation of the cov-
enant of good faith and fair dealing, the court explained that a
complaining employee must prove that the employer committed a
contract breach in order to base a claim on a breach of the cove-
nant.21 Citing Nicholson, the court granted summary judgment to
the employer because the employee failed to prove that his con-
tract had been breached: "Since the court concludes the defend-
ants did not breach plaintiff's employment contract, the defend-
ants cannot be found to have acted unreasonably and in breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
22
The Montana Supreme Court followed Maxwell in Nordlund
v. School District No. 14.23 In Nordlund, the school district re-
fused to renew a high school superintendent's one-year contract. 2"
The superintendent alleged that failure to renew the contract con-
stituted a breach of the covenant. 25 Noting that the language of the
contract permitted non-renewal, the court affirmed the grant of
summary judgment in favor of the employer.26 In so doing, the
court refused to examine the circumstances surrounding the non-
renewal. Rather, it stated the clear principle now governing em-
ployment covenant cases: "As in Maxwell, because no breach of
contract occurred, it cannot be said that the school board breached
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."27
The Nordlund rule, that a contract breach is a condition pre-
cedent to a covenant breach, substantially limited the ability of
employees with written contracts to escape a summary judgment
motion. An employee first had to demonstrate some specific way in
which the contract had been breached. General allegations of im-
proper motive or a misevaluation of employee performance usually
did not suffice to make a prima facie case, unless the employee
could tie the employer's misconduct to a breached contract clause.
The requirement of a contract breach brought the employment
covenant closer to traditional employment law, in which the plain-
tiffs and defendants argued about contract breaches rather than
covenant breaches. This new emphasis on contract breaches, how-
20. 645 F. Supp. 937 (D. Mont. 1986).
21. Id. at 939.
22. Id.
23. 227 Mont. 402, 738 P.2d 1299 (1987).
24. Id. at 404, 738 P.2d at 1300.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 406, 738 P.2d at 1302.
[Vol. 51
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ever, created a glaring internal inconsistency in Montana employ-
ment covenant law.
In Gates II the Montana Supreme Court had followed Califor-
nia's lead by denominating an employee's action for breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a tort action rather than
a contract action. Gates II was important, because a plaintiff's re-
covery in tort could include punitive damages and damages for
emotional distress, while recovery on a contract action was usually
restricted to back pay and reinstatement or, possibly, some limited
front pay. Labeling a breach of the covenant as a tort had such a
significant bearing on an employee's potential recovery that it elic-
ited strong sentiments on the Montana Supreme Court. Gates II,
decided by a four-three vote, with two separate dissents, reflected
the deep division present on the court. This designation of the
breach of the covenant as a tort constituted Montana employers'
major, but not sole, objection to the new case law. After Nordlund,
a suit for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
became something of a hybrid action. An employee had to show a
contract breach, just as in any other contract action; but, once the
employee had established a breach, the tort measure of damages
would come into play.
B. Creating Exceptions to the Covenant
As the Montana Supreme Court struggled to define the basic
elements of an employer's duty of good faith and fair dealing, it
also carved out exceptions to the covenant. Within a two-month
period in 1986, the court exempted judicial employees, church em-
ployees, and unionized employees from the coverage of the cove-
nant. The first exception occurred in Mead v. McKittrick,8 in
which a court secretary sued a district court judge for wrongful dis-
charge and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.29 The court held that a statute giving the judges judicial
immunity extended the immunity to personnel actions.30 Shortly
thereafter, the court created the second exception to the covenant
in Miller v. Catholic Diocese of Great Falls.31 In Miller, the court
held that a discharged parochial school teacher could not sue her
church employer under the covenant, because such an action would
constitute judicial interference with the church's affairs in viola-
28. 223 Mont. 428, 727 P.2d 517 (1986).
29. Id. at 430, 727 P.2d at 518.
30. Id. at 431, 727 P.2d at 519.
31. 224 Mont. 113, 728 P.2d 794 (1986).
1990]
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tion of the constitutional guarantee of free exercise of religion."2
The Montana Supreme Court established the third, and most
important, exception to the right to sue for a breach of the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing in Brinkman v. State.3" In
Brinkman, the plaintiff was a state employee covered by a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, who had been terminated from his
job."' The negotiated agreement contained a grievance procedure
ending in binding arbitration by a neutral third party,3 5 and termi-
nations were grievable under the contract.38 Despite these provi-
sions, the employee chose not to file a union grievance contesting
his termination. Instead, he went to court alleging breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.-7 The Montana Supreme
Court began its analysis with a lengthy discourse on federal labor
law. The court, noting the similarities between state and federal
collective-bargaining statutes, relied on federal case law to support
the general rule that a person covered under a collective-bargain-
ing contract may not evade the grievance procedure in the contract
by filing a common-law action to remedy the alleged wrong.38 The
court based its strong deference to contractual grievance proce-
dures on the judicial presumption that collectively bargained griev-
ance procedures are effective and efficient forums for dispute set-
tlement, and on the fact that the legislature had endorsed
statutorily this method of handling workplace disagreements. 9
Thus, the policy reasons that had moved the court to imply a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in other settings did not
exist in unionized environments. The implied covenant doctrine
developed, because courts had been confronted with grievously
wronged employees who could not vindicate themselves through
any existing legal remedy. In Brinkman, for example, the court
noted that an employee who has access to a formal grievance pro-
cedure ending in arbitration is presumed to have a legal remedy:
"It cannot be said, in the normal situation, that contract grievance
procedures are inadequate to protect the interests of an aggrieved
employee until the employee has attempted to implement the pro-
cedures and found them so. '40
32. Id. at 116-17, 728 P.2d at 796.
33. 224 Mont. 238, 729 P.2d 1301 (1986).
34. Id. at 239, 729 P.2d at 1302.
35. Id. at 241, 729 P.2d at 1304.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 244-45, 729 P.2d at 1306.
39. Id. at 250, 729 P.2d at 1309.
40. Id. at 244, 729 P.2d at 1306 (citing Small v. McRae, 200 Mont. 497, 651 P.2d 982
[Vol. 51
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The court then linked the existence of a contractual grievance
procedure to the "objective manifestations" standard it had devel-
oped in Dare. The court stated, "Here the collective bargaining
agreement contained the objective manifestations of the employer
to the employee about the latter's status .... [N]o other covenant
need be implied."4 ' Thus, under Brinkman, an employee covered
by a contractual grievance procedure could not bring suit under an
implied covenant unless by his claim he could "invoke state inter-
ests in protecting the general public which outweigh the interest in
supporting the collective bargaining process and justify application
of the covenant. '42 The case law cited in Brinkman summarily dis-
missed implied covenant cases, even when the plaintiff alleged he
was fired for reporting statutory violations or enforcing statutory
rights. In light of these precedents, the circumstances in which an
employee covered by a collective-bargaining agreement could bring
suit seemed narrow indeed.
The employees covered by the exceptions of Mead, Miller, and
Brinkman were a minority of the state work force. Nevertheless,
these cases have an importance that goes beyond the number of
employees directly affected by the decisions. These three cases re-
flect the ideological pulling and tugging going on within the court.
None of the decisions were unanimous and in each case, at least
two justices dissented who had earlier helped form a majority in
the cases expanding the concept of the implied covenant. The
cases indicate that a majority of the justices was unsatisfied with
the present state of the law but was unwilling to reverse Gates I,
Gates II, Nye, and Dare. Thus, a majority could be cobbled to-
gether under one or another exception, but no consistent or cohe-
sive majority evolved to guide development of employment cove-
nant law.
C. Shifting Standards for Applying the Covenant
In late 1987, the court decided the first of a group of cases
that suggested the covenant of good faith and fair dealing offered
primarily procedural protections to an employee and placed few
substantive restrictions on the grounds an employer may use to
terminate an employee. In Belcher v. Department of State
Lands,4 the court rejected the claims of an employee, because his
(1982)).
41. Id. at 250, 729 P.2d at 1309.
42. Riley v. Warm Springs State Hosp., 229 Mont. 518, 521, 748 P.2d 455, 457 (1987)
(in which the court reaffirmed and explained Brinkman).
43. 228 Mont. 352, 742 P.2d 475 (1987).
1990]
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employer had followed proper procedures in making the termina-
tion.44 The court's decision was simplified by the employee's ac-
knowledgment that he had been less than an exemplary employee,
but, in the employee's opinion, not bad enough to be fired.45 This
decision displayed a deference, unseen since before Gates I, to the
subjective judgment of employers. The court emphasized that the
employer had the right to establish and enforce employee perform-
ance standards free of interference from the judiciary: "This Court
will not interfere with the Department of State Lands' right to
manage its affairs and hire employees who will perform their jobs
so long as there is a standard of discipline and the Department has
abided by it."4 6
A subsequent decision also indicated that if an employer fol-
lowed reasonable procedures or progressive discipline, a court
would rarely look behind the reasons given for the discharge.47 Up-
holding summary judgment for the employer, the court in Coombs
v. Gamer Shoe Co. 8 stated:
Even if the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
governs the employment relationship, an employer may still ter-
minate an employee as long as the employer gives a fair and hon-
est reason.
[Tihis Court recognizes that employers must have discretion
in making personnel decisions. Thus, absent any evidence of dis-
honesty or pretext ... [the employer's] actions would be appro-
priate given an employer's discretion to make personnel decisions
it feels are in its best interests.'
49
The Coombs test of honesty or lack of pretext thus appears to be a
subjective rather than an objective test. That is, if an employer
genuinely believes that grounds for discharge exist, then the dis-
charge is valid even if the employer's beliefs eventually prove
unfounded.5
44. Id. at 356-57, 742 P.2d at 477-78.
45. Id. at 356, 742 P.2d at 477.
46. Id. at 358-59, 742 P.2d at 479.
47. An exception to this rule exists when an employee claims that his discharge vio-
lated public policy.
48. - Mont. -, 778 P.2d 845 (1989).
49. Id. at __, 778 P.2d at 887 (citation omitted).
50. This test is comparable to the test used in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),
in which "good faith" is defined as "honesty in fact." U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1989). The UCC
good faith requirement has generally been interpreted as imposing a subjective test or, as at
least one court has called it, the "white heart" test, which relies on motive instead of actual
knowledge. See, Eldon's Super Fresh Stores v. Merrill Lynch, 296 Minn. 130, 136, 207
N.W.2d 282, 287 (1973); Frantz v. First Nat'l Bank, 584 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Alaska 1978). The
[Vol. 51
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The subjective standard of employer good faith used in
Coombs differs from the standard of employer good faith used by
the court five years earlier in Crenshaw. In Crenshaw the court
found a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, in
part, because the employer failed to adequately investigate
whether a probationary employee was guilty of misconduct before
firing her.51 The Crenshaw court used a higher, objective standard
akin to the Uniform Commercial Code's "observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade. 52 Further, the
court allowed expert testimony to determine whether the employer
had met this higher standard.53 The Coombs test also differs from
the standard of good faith the court articulated three years earlier
in Nicholson.54 While the Coombs test is similar to the test of
"honesty in fact," the Montana Supreme Court has stated that a
"breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as
defined in Nicholson, requires more than a lack of 'honesty in
fact.' ,55 Reconciling the standards of conduct enunciated by the
court in Crenshaw, Nicholson, and Coombs is a difficult task.
Another example of the shifting standards that have bedeviled
this area of law in the past several years is a four-three decision
handed down only six months before Coombs. In Prout v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co.,56 the court was faced point blank with the question
of whether, through a clearly worded contract clause, an employee
could waive her rights to the protection of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.5 7 In Prout, the employee had signed the fol-
lowing boilerplate waiver form developed by Sears to protect itself
against implied covenant of good faith claims:
In consideration of my employment, I agree to conform to the
rules and regulations of Sears, Roebuck & Co. and my employ-
ment and compensation can be terminated with or without no-
Montana Supreme Court has said, "[tihe tort of breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, as defined in Nicholson, requires more than a lack of 'honesty in
fact.'" McGregor v. Mommer, 220 Mont. 98, 109, 714 P.2d 536, 543 (1986). Such a test for
employer conduct might be labeled the "cream heart" or "beige heart" standard, because
the court need not even look at the motive behind a termination, unless the employee makes
some showing that the termination was carried out in an "arbitrary, capricious or unreason-
able" manner as stated in Nicholson.
51. 213 Mont. at 500, 693 P.2d at 493.
52. Id.
53. 213 Mont. at 501-04, 693 P.2d at 493-95.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 15-19, for discussion of the Nicholson standard
of good faith.
55. McGregor, 220 Mont. 98, 109, 714 P.2d 536, 543 (1986). For further discussion on
this point, see supra note 50.
56. - Mont. -, 772 P.2d 288 (1989).
57. Id. at -, 772 P.2d at 289.
1990]
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tice, at any time, at the option of either the company or myself. I
understand that no . . . representative of Sears . . . has any au-
thority to enter into any agreement for employment for any speci-
fied period of time, or to make any agreement contrary to the
foregoing. 8
The court looked this clause straight in the eye, and blinked; it
refused to hold the clause invalid as a matter of public policy and
it refused to give it effect in this case. 9 Instead, the court held that
the employer's counsel waived the right to rely on the signed state-
ment by not mentioning it in relation to a contested issue of law in
the pre-trial order.6 0 The court then enunciated a standard for em-
ployer conduct that allowed an employer to terminate at-will em-
ployees "without cause," but conditioned that right on the contra-
dictory requirement that the reason for termination not be a "false
cause." The court stated:
[W]e give effect to the employment application and record card.
These give the employer the right to fire without cause. They do
not give the employer the right to fire for a false cause. If the at-
will employer who can fire without cause under the employment
contract chooses instead to fire an employee for dishonesty, the
discharged employee must be given the opportunity to prove the
charge of dishonesty false."
Prout is an example of the court giving with one hand and
taking away with the other. On the one hand, the decision affirmed
the right of an employer to maintain an indefinite at-will status
under which employees could be fired without cause. On the other
hand, the decision qualified that right by requiring that employers
not terminate for a false cause. This left open the possibility of a
legal challenge to almost any discharge merely by an employee's
allegation of false cause. The court earlier had vacillated between
an objective and subjective standard for determining a false cause.
In Prout, however, it appeared that an employer could be found in
breach of the covenant even if the employer terminated an em-
ployee under the sincere, but mistaken, belief that cause existed.
This certainly was not the standard the court laid out in Belcher
or in Coombs. Under the rule of those cases, the issue in
Prout-even if the court had invalidated Sears' waiver-should
have been whether Sears had reason to believe that Prout was dis-
honest, not whether Prout was in fact dishonest. The former is a
58. Id.
59. Id. at -, 772 P.2d at 291-92.
60. Id.
61. Id. at -, 772 P.2d at 292.
[Vol. 51
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subjective standard derived from McGregor, Belcher, and Coombs;
the latter is an objective standard harking back to Crenshaw. Ad-
ditional examples exist on how the court relied on a principle in
one case, without explaining how it meshed with principles laid
down in previous covenant cases. For example, in Flanigan v. Pru-
dential Savings & Loan,62 the court held that a "long-term em-
ployee has an expectation of continued employment provided that
the employee's work performance is satisfactory."6 Thus, the court
upheld a jury award of almost $1.5 million to a discharged bank
teller with 28 years of service. 4 The pronouncement in Flanigan3
reversed the rule stated in Reiter v. Yellowstone County,6 that
lengthy employment alone was not sufficient to create an implied
contract term that the employer could terminate only for good
cause. 7 The court, however, made absolutely no mention of Reiter,
and merely treated the creation of a good cause standard through
lengthy employment as a natural consequence of the Dare "objec-
tive manifestations" standard.6 8 The Flanigan court made clear it
was drawing from California law for guidance by its reliance on a
leading California case, Cleary v. American Airlines.9 The ques-
tion of whether lengthy employment could by itself give rise to
good cause protection against termination was one of the most con-
troversial aspects of California covenant law. Therefore, one might
have expected something other than a sub silentio reversal of prior
Montana law on that controversial issue.
All through the 1980s, as the court struggled to define the em-
ployer's covenant, it continued to use the rhetoric of at-will em-
ployment and insisted that the employer maintained the right to
terminate an at-will employee without cause. The court refused to
acknowledge that, by qualifying the right to terminate without
cause and by adding a requirement of good faith, it effectively
eliminated at-will employment. When the law requires an em-
ployer to show that every employee termination is supported by
something variously called cause, good cause, just cause, reasonable
cause, a reasonable basis, or a valid reason, then the employment is
no longer at-will. Whenever an employer has the obligation of jus-
62. 221 Mont. 419, 720 P.2d 257 (1986).
63. Id. at 426, 720 P.2d at 261.
64. Id. at 421, 720 P.2d at 258.
65. Id. at 427, 720 P.2d at 262.
66. - Mont. -. , 627 P.2d 845 (1982).
67. Id. at -, 627 P.2d at 848-50.
68. 221 Mont. at 427, 720 P.2d at 262.
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tifying an employee termination, that employment is not at-will
employment. To say, as the court stated in Crenshaw, that
"[e]mployers can still terminate untenured employees at-will and
without notice [but] simply may not do so in bad faith or unfairly
• . . ,,70 drains all traditional meaning from the term at-will and
leaves the at-will statute a hollow shell, devoid of all substance.
The court's continued failure to acknowledge forthrightly that
it had eliminated at-will employment stemmed from the continued
presence of the at-will provision in Montana statutes.7 1 The court
engaged in a judicial repeal of the at-will statute, because it
thought the statute was poor public policy. The court, however,
could not admit to such an action because such an acknowledge-
ment would be evidence of the boldest kind of judicial overreach-
ing.72 Instead, the court continued to talk as if the statute still had
some meaning, while at the same time it developed new law that
was inconsistent with the statute. It is this dilemma, the need to
assert the validity of a statute even while draining meaning from
it, that makes one employment covenant decision so difficult to
reconcile with another.
D. The Uncertain Future for the Common Law Employment
Tort
In 1988, the Montana Supreme Court in Frigon v. Morrison-
Maierle, Inc.,73 limited the employment covenant by declaring it
applicable only in cases of employee termination, but not applica-
ble in cases involving resignation, demotion, faulty evaluation, or a
whole range of other potential employee misconduct."' Just months
before, in Stark v. Circle K Corp.,75 the court refused to overturn
an award of $70,000 in punitive damages and ten years front pay to
a convenience store manager, who was discharged with less than
three years total employment with the employer and less than ten
70. 213 Mont. at 498, 693 P.2d at 492.
71. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-503 (1989).
72. The court could have declared the at-will statute unconstitutional on the basis
that it was inconsistent with article II, section 3 of the Montana Constitution, which guaran-
tees all persons the inalienable right to pursue life's basic necessities. The court could have
viewed security in one's livelihood as one of life's basic necessities. In his concurring opinion
in Dare, Justice Morrison hinted at this avenue for declaring the at-will statute inoperative,
but no subsequent decision followed this line of reasoning. Dare, 212 Mont. at 285-86, 687
P.2d at 1021-22.
73. 233 Mont. 113, 760 P.2d 57 (1988).
74. Id. at 117, 760 P.2d at 60. However, if an employer's conduct were egregious
enough, a constructive discharge might be provable, in which case the covenant would
apply.
75. 230 Mont. 468, 751 P.2d 162 (1988).
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months experience as a regional manager."6 By limiting the cause
of action in Frigon, just after broadening the scope of available
damages in Stark, the Montana Supreme Court made it difficult to
discern the case-law principles governing the various tort actions
commonly encompassed under the rubric of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing and wrongful discharge."
By late 1989 it appeared that the court had circumscribed the
reach of the covenant since 1985, with occasional exceptions in vis-
ible high damage suits. This seemingly rightward drift, possibly
the response to a public perception that courts in general were cre-
ating too many new causes of action, was not the result of a logical
easy-to-chart progression of decisions. Rather, the case law as re-
viewed above can be characterized as two steps to the right, fol-
lowed by one step back to the left, repeated several times over. a
From 1982 to 1989 almost every major decision had, if not a vigor-
ous dissent, a concurrence expressing philosophical reservations. In
Prout all of these reservations came to the fore in a vigorous three-
member dissent, which amounted to nothing less than a declara-
76. Id. at 470-71, 751 P.2d at 163-64.
77. The court at various times categorized employee termination torts into four differ-
ent actions: 1) violation of public policy, 2) breach of an implied or express promise of job
security, 3) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and 4) negligence. As the
majority noted in Prout, these four causes of action frequently overlap. Prout, - Mont.
- - 772 P.2d 288, 291 (1989). This is an understatement. As noted in the concurrence
in Dare, virtually all employer related conduct that is prohibited under the first, second, or
fourth theories above is also proscribed under the general breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. Dare, 212 Mont. at 284-85, 687 P.2d at 1021-22 (Morrison, J., concur-
ring). This broad meaning of the phrase "duty of good faith and fair dealing" is the usage
that is generally employed in this article. Readers of Montana Supreme Court cases should
be alerted to the fact that the court often (but not always) uses the term "wrongful dis-
charge" in a restricted sense to denominate a discharge made in violation of public policy.
[Blreach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a separate tort from
wrongful discharge. The latter is premised on acts by the employer in violation of
public policy, while the former is broader, and does not require a public policy
violation.
Frigon, 233 Mont. at 117, 760 P.2d at 60. For an explanation of the Montana Supreme
Court's division of wrongful discharge, negligent discharge, and bad faith discharge into
three causes of action, see Rupnow v. City of Poison, 234 Mont. 66, 761 P.2d 802 (1988).
78. This general trend on the court toward a narrowed view of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is the result of a gradual change in the philosophical tenor of the
court's membership since Gates I. From 1982 through 1988, every newly seated justice on
the court has been more conservative on the employment covenant issue than his predeces-
sor. This is demonstrated by taking every major employment good faith decision, from
Gates I through Coombs, and noting whether a justice voted for a narrow construction of
the covenant, as urged by the employer, or for an expansive construction of the covenant, as
urged by the employee. The results are as follows, with the justices listed in order of their
accession to the court: 14
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tion of intent to reverse Gates II. 71 Just as the court in Gates If
had earlier looked to California case law in labeling breach of the
covenant a tort action, the dissenting justices in Prout looked to a
recent California case that now declared such suits to be contract
actions.80 Whether the dissenters can forge a majority on this ques-
tion remains to be seen. For most Montana employees and employ-
ers, however, the question today is of less importance than it might
have been just a year or two earlier due to the enactment of
WDFEA in 1987.
III. THE PASSAGE OF THE WRONGFUL DISCHARGE FROM
EMPLOYMENT ACT
Prior to 1987, the case-law development from Gates I to Cren-
shaw generated a belief among Montana employers and insurance
companies who paid the damages for many employment tort ac-
tions that their best hope for changing the direction of the law was
through direct legislative action."' These groups turned for advice
to the Montana Association of Defense Counsel, made up, to a
large extent, of lawyers who defend employers and insurance com-
panies. The result was a draft of a bill that, after several legislative
reworkings, became the Wrongful Discharge From Employment
Narrow Broad
Construction Construction
Justice of Covenant of Covenant
Harrison 9 4
Haswell (succeeded by Turnage) 0 6
Daly (succeeded by Gulbrandson) 0 2
Shea (succeeded by Hunt) 0 3
Sheehy 5 10






The decisions reflected in the chart are: Gates I, Gates II, Nye, Dare, Crenshaw, Nordlund,
Mead, Miller, Brinkman, Belcher, Flanigan, Frigon, Stark, Prout, Meech, and Coombs.
79. Prout, - Mont. at __, 772 P.2d at 292-97 (Weber, J., dissenting).
80. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211
(1988).
81. In 1988 the Montana Supreme Court gave insurers some measure of relief for dam-
ages resulting from employee terminations. In Daly Ditches Irrigation Dist. v. National Sur.
Corp., 234 Mont. 537, 539, 764 P.2d 1276, 1278 (1988), the court held that terminating an
employee is an intentional act; thus damages flowing therefrom are not the result of an
accident, which would remove the discharge from the coverage of the employer's liability
insurance policy. See Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Co-op Supply, Inc., 699 F. Supp.
1438 (D. Mont. 1988), for an earlier contrary federal court decision. 15
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Act of 1987.2
The introduced bill was, itself, a dramatic example of the shift
in employers' perceptions of what was an acceptable (or perhaps
achievable) public policy on employee discharges. The initial bill
did not seek to turn back the clock to a the at-will philosophy that
existed prior to Gates I. Rather, it incorporated the general princi-
ple that lengthy employment entitled employees to protection
from arbitrary discharge. Toward that end, the bill mandated that
employees with five years seniority could be terminated only for
good cause.8 3 Additionally, the bill acknowledged the legitimacy of
the so-called wrongful discharge cases that had forbidden dis-
charge of an employee for enforcing or refusing to violate some
public policy. Although the bill defined public policy narrowly, it
prohibited any discharge made "in retaliation for the employee's
refusal to violate public policy or for reporting a violation of public
policy."8'
Whether these concessions to case-law innovations of the pre-
ceding several years were made out of an acceptance of those prin-
ciples, or merely demonstrated the sponsors' desire to avoid the
appearance of being unacceptably reactionary, made little differ-
ence. Once the drafters of House Bill 241 decided to incorporate
good cause and public policy discharges into the bill, the. end result
could not be a return to the status quo existing prior to Gates 1.8
5
Nevertheless, the sponsors of House Bill 241 made sure that they
had ample leeway to make concessions while still retaining an ac-
ceptable bill. Between the bill's introduction and its passage, the
legislature adopted numerous changes, which made the bill more
favorable to employees. First, the legislature expanded protections
against wrongful discharge to cover any non-probationary em-
ployee, rather than only those who had been with an employer five
years or more. Second, discharges in violation of an employer's
written personnel policies were made specifically actionable,
82. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (1989).
83. H.B. 241, First Reading, section 4(2). The enacted bill differed from the first read-
ing, however, because the drafters extended the protection against discharges made without
good cause to "employees who had ccmpleted the employer's probationary period of em-
ployment," rather than to employees having a minimum of five years of seniority. MONT.
CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(2).
84. H.B. 241, First Reading, section 4(1) (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1)
(1989)).
85. An employer's attorney who lobbied for passage of H.B. 241 told this author:
"Good cause and public policy discharges were illegal aliens in the statutory world, pro-
tected only in judicially created sanctuaries, and we have gone and made them full-fledged
citizens."
86. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(2) (1989).
1990]
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thereby incorporating the principle adopted in Nye. Third, the
legislature expanded the amount of damages recoverable by a
wrongfully discharged employee from a maximum of two years to
four years wages, plus lost fringe benefits.8 8 In its final form,
WDFEA represented a compromise that came down somewhere
between the traditional at-will rules and the high-damage tort
rules promulgated by the Montana Supreme Court after Gates I.
A major feature of the law is that it "provides the exclusive
remedy for a wrongful discharge from employment" 9 and ex-
pressly prohibits claims for discharge arising "from tort or express
or implied contract." 90 Under WDFEA a wrongful discharge can
arise in three different ways.
A discharge is wrongful only if:
(1) it was in retaliation for the employee's refusal to violate public
policy or for reporting a violation of public policy;
(2) the discharge was not for good cause and the employee had
completed the employer's probationary period of employment; or
(3) the employer violated the express provisions of its own writ-
ten personnel policy. 1
WDFEA defines public policy as "a policy.., concerning the pub-
lic health, safety, or welfare established by constitutional provi-
sion, statute, or administrative rule." 92 Three different phrases de-
fine good cause, with the broadest phrase-"legitimate business
reason"-subsuming the other two phrases.93 As noted above, the
damages available to a wrongfully discharged employee are limited
to a maximum of four years of salary and fringe benefits, minus
"amounts the employee could have earned with reasonable dili-
gence." '94 Thus, WDFEA reverses recently adopted employment
case law by prohibiting damages for "pain and suffering," "emo-
87. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(3) (1989).
88. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905(1) (1989).
89. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-902 (1989).
90. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-913 (1989). The bill contains some exceptions to its "ex-
clusive" coverage and these exceptions are discussed in sections E and F of part V, infra.
91. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904 (1989).
92. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(7) (1989).
93. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(5) (1989). The other phrases are "reasonable job-
related grounds for dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties" and
"disruption of the employer's operation." Id.
94. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905(1) (1989). Unemployment benefits were also to be
deducted from any damages in the introduced version of H.B. 241. The Judiciary Commit-
tee of the House of Representatives deleted this provision. 1987 H. JouR. 483. Presumably,
this means that unemployment benefits may not be used as an offset in damage calculations,
contrary to the apparent holding in Dawson v. Billings Gazette, 223 Mont. 415, 417, 726
P.2d 826, 828 (1986).
[Vol. 51
17
Schramm: Montana Employment Law and the 1987 Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act: A New Order Begins
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1990
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE STATUTE
tional distress," and any damages not explicitly allowed by
WDFEA 5 Punitive damages are available only in public policy
based discharges, if "actual fraud" or "actual malice" is shown. 6
WDFEA establishes a one-year statute of limitation for filing a
wrongful-discharge action. 7 This provision contrasts with the
three-year statute of limitation that had previously been applicable
to employment-based tort actions.9 However, if an employer has a
written internal grievance procedure, notifies a discharged em-
ployee of the procedure, and supplies the employee with a copy of
the procedure, the employee is then obligated to process his com-
plaint first through the employer's grievance procedure. If the em-
ployee fails to use the employer's grievance procedure, such failure
"is a defense to an action brought under [WDFEA]." 9
Moreover, WDFEA contains a unique arbitration clause. 100
Once a plaintiff files a wrongful discharge suit, either party may,
within sixty days, request the commencing of arbitration under the
provisions of the Uniform Arbitration Act. 10 1 If the other party re-
jects the request to arbitrate, the litigation goes forward; however,
if the party who refused to arbitrate loses the lawsuit, then that
party will be liable for the other party's attorney fees. 102 Also, if an
employee tenders an arbitration offer that the employer accepts,
and the employee subsequently prevails at arbitration, then the
employer must reimburse the employee for all expenses attributa-
ble to the arbitration.'03 This provision was adopted to ensure that
an impoverished employee with a meritorious claim would not
hesitate to request arbitration because of an inability to pay the
costs of arbitration.
WDFEA contains three exemptions. It does not apply to any
discharge actionable under the Human Rights Act or Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act.'0" Further, it excludes "an employee
covered by a written collective bargaining agreement" or any em-
ployee covered by "a written contract of employment for a specific
term." 0
95. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905(3) (1989).
96. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905(2) (1989).
97. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-911(1) (1989).
98. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-204(1) (1989).
99. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-911(2)-(3) (1989).
100. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-914 (1989).
101. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-914(2)-(3) (1989).
102. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-914(4) (1989).
103. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-914(5) (1989).
104. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-912(1) (1989).
105. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-912(2) (1989). The collective bargaining exemption
codifies the rule adopted in Brinkman. See also supra notes 147-56 and accompanying text.
1990]
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Similar legislative attempts to mitigate or codify state- court
decisions on the employment covenant have failed in several states
and in Congress in recent years."' Currently, Montana is the only
state in which legislation such as WDFEA has been enacted. After
WDFEA's enactment, the next major question was whether
WDFEA could survive a constitutional challenge before the Mon-
tana Supreme Court. In 1987 every reason existed to believe that it
would not.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS THE ACT
The Montana Supreme Court's creation of the employment
tort of breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing was only
one chapter in a story of increasing court activism in Montana.
During the early 1980s, the court repeatedly invalidated legislative
policy choices limiting the liability of public agencies and the
rights of welfare-system beneficiaries. 107 The centerpiece of the
court's justification for its activism was article II, section 16 of the
Montana Constitution, commonly referred to as the "full legal re-
dress" clause.1 08 In a 1919 decision, Shea v. North Butte Mining
Co.,109 this provision was interpreted to require courts to mete out
justice speedily and evenhandedly; but the clause conveyed no sub-
stantive right to any particular remedy. In 1983, however, Justice
Morrison, writing for a four-member court majority in White v.
State,110 announced the broad principle that article II, section 16
had a substantive aspect to it."' The court overturned Shea, hold-
ing that legislative authority to modify common-law remedies was
limited.1 2 Under the new interpretation of article II, section 16,
once the legislature or supreme court created a legal rem-
edy-either by statute or case law-an individual's ability to seek
that remedy became a vested, fundamental right, which the legisla-
106. See Gould, Job Security in the United States: Some Reflections on Unfair Dis-
missal and Plant Closure Legislation from a Comparative Perspective, 67 NEB. L. REv. 28,
40-41 (1988); Stieber & Baines, The Michigan Experience with Employment-At-Will, 67
NEB. L. REV. 140, 172 (1988).
107. A critical analysis of what is portrayed as the Court's increasing intrusion on the
powers of the legislative branch is found in Lopach, The Montana Supreme Court in Polit-
ics, 48 MONT. L. REv. 267 (1987) [hereinafter Lopach].
108. "Courts of Justice shall be open to every person, and speedy remedy afforded for
every injury of person, property, or character. No person shall be deprived of this full legal
redress .... " Id. This provision was identical in the 1889 Montana Constitution. MONT.
CONST. art. III, § 6 (1889).
109. 55 Mont. 522, 179 P. 499 (1919).
110. 203 Mont. 363, 661 P.2d 1272 (1983).
111. Id. at 368-69, 179 P.2d at 1274-75.
112. Id. at 369, 179 P.2d at 1275.
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ture could remove or reduce only by showing a compelling state
interest.
1 1 3
To many people it appeared that the court had created a sys-
tem in which the rights of plaintiffs were steadily ratcheted up-
ward and the legislature was rendered powerless to stop the pro-
cess. One response to this was the appearance of Constitutional
Initiative 30 on the 1986 general election ballot. This initiative de-
leted the words "every injury" and "full legal redress" from article
II, section 16. " 4 The intent of the initiative was to restore to the
section its previous interpretation under the Shea rule. The initia-
tive passed by a vote of 172,502 to 136,653." 5 The Montana Su-
preme Court, however, by a vote of four-three, invalidated the
election results for two reasons. First, the Secretary of State failed
to publish the exact wording of the initiative as required by stat-
ute." ' Second, the Attorney General inadequately summarized the
initiative in his formal explanation to the voters.11 7
The Governor signed WDFEA on May 11, 1987. Constitutional
Initiative 30 was invalidated on May 22, 1987. With the death of
the initiative, the White rule limiting the legislature's authority to
reduce remedies remained intact. As long as White applied,
WDFEA's abolition of the newly created tort of breach of the duty
of good faith and fair dealing and WDFEA's limitation on damages
were clearly in jeopardy. It was in this legal atmosphere that the
Montana Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
WDFEA in Meech v. Hilihaven West, Inc." " during the summer of
1989.
The Montana Supreme Court did not avoid the broad consti-
tutional issues raised by WDFEA and made no attempt to recon-
cile WDFEA with the White rule limiting legislative authority. " 9
Rather, the court used the opportunity to demolish the full legal
113. See Lopach, supra note 106, at 31, for a more complete chronology of the devel-
opment of the vested-right doctrine.
114. For wording of the initiative and a report of the election results of Constitutional
Initiative No. 30, see 1987 Mont. Laws 2080-81.
115. 1987 Mont. Laws 2080.
116. State ex rel. Montana Citizens for the Preservation of Citizen's Rights v. Walter-
mire, 224 Mont. 273, 738 P.2d 1255-56 (1987).
117. Id. The official voter information pamphlet distributed by the Secretary of State
made it appear as if the words "full legal redress" were being added to the constitution
instead of accurately showing that the initiative deleted those very words. Id.
118. - Mont. -, 776 P.2d 488 (1989).
119. Such a reconciliation could have been based on the fact that the common-law
employment torts abrogated by WDFEA had not become vested, because they were of re-
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redress holding of White in a broad opinion that has constitutional
ramifications well beyond employment law. The four-member ma-
jority restored to article II, section 16 the meaning that it had
under Shea, thereby upholding WDFEA and restoring the legisla-
ture's authority to revise traditional remedies.1 0
In overturning White, the court discarded the principle that
any reduction of employee common-law remedies by WDFEA must
be based on a compelling state interest. The court clarified "that
the proper test to apply to the Act's classifications burdening one
class and not another is the rational basis test." '' With this lower
standard as its guide, the court majority had no trouble finding
reasons why WDFEA was, in fact, rational.
[L]awmakers perceived an unreasonable financial threat to Mon-
tana employers from large judgments in common-law wrongful
discharge claims. The Act's limitation on damages is intended to
alleviate these threats.
... Some awards for common-law wrongful discharge have
included wages which extend far into the claimant's employment
future. The effect of the Act's limitations on damages to four
years lost wages rationally relates to reducing this potential
liability.'
The court then noted that even if the full legal redress provi-
sion of Montana's Constitution required the legislature to provide
a new benefit for any pre-existing remedy it abrogates, WDFEA
still passed muster, because "the benefits of the Act for employees
are not illusory."1 3 In the court's eyes, the major benefit of
WDFEA was its requirement that employers show good cause
before terminating any employee who has completed a probation-
ary period."2 4
In order to highlight the rights gained by employees in
120. Meech resulted not from a change of heart by any of the high court justices, but
rather from a change of one body on the court. In Pfost v. State, 219 Mont. 206, 713 P.2d
495 (1985), a four-member majority stoutly defended and followed White while three dis-
senting votes were cast by Chief Justice Turnage and Justices Weber and Gulbrandson. In
Meech these three justices plus newly elected Justice McDonough formed the majority. The
three Meech dissenters were Justices Sheehy, Harrison, and Hunt, all of whom formed the
majority along with Justice Morrison in Pfost. In other words, the substitution of McDon-
ough for Morrison switched the balance of opinion on the court.
It is not the purpose of this article to explore the far-reaching constitutional implica-
tions of Meech, although the constitutional implications themselves are certainly a worthy
subject. Rather, it is enough to note here that Meech is an important waystation on the road
from at-will employment to Gates I, to WDFEA, and beyond.
121. Meech, - Mont. at -, 776 P.2d at 507.
122. Id. at -, 776 P.2d at 504 (citation omitted).
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WDFEA, the court stressed that employers would have great lati-
tude in terminating employees in the absence of WDFEA. But the
court's discussion of employer rights that had been taken away by
WDFEA exaggerated the amount of discretion employers actually
possessed under the court's recent case law. For example, the court
cited Prout for the proposition that without WDFEA an employer
could easily preserve the right to fire an employee "without
cause."1 25 The court, however, failed to mention the major qualifi-
cation Prout placed on that right, that a termination could not be
for a "false cause. "126 In Meech the majority's description of pre-
WDFEA case law made it sound as if the at-will presumption still
remained the dominant feature of Montana employment law and
the case law since Gates I had been only a minor deviation from
that principle. This certainly was not correct, and as a vigorous
dissent pointed out, WDFEA enhanced, rather than diminished,
employer rights.
1 27
The debate in Meech over whether WDFEA increased or de-
creased employer rights was really just a sideshow. Once the court
decided that White was no longer good law and that the legislature
possessed broad authority to craft legal remedies, the validation of
WDFEA was foreordained.
V. THE IMPACT OF THE NEW LEGISLATION
A. National Attention
WDFEA attracted national attention. 128 The Wall Street
Journal followed the Meech case noting that it involved "Mon-
tana's unique worker-discharge statute.' ' 2 9 The American Civil
Liberties Union submitted an amicus curiae brief in Meech urging
the court to uphold WDFEA.130 In the brief, the ACLU reviewed
national developments in employment covenant law as follows:
125. Id. (citing Prout, - Mont. at -, 772 P.2d at 292).
126. Prout, - Mont. at -, 772 P.2d at 292.
127. Meech, - Mont. at -, 776 P.2d at 507-17 (Sheehy, J., dissenting). Justice
Sheehy was so pained by the diminution of employee rights, that he stated the decision
marked "the blackest judicial day in the history of the state." Id.
128. See, e.g., Tompkins, Legislating the Employment Relationship: Montana's
Wrongful-Discharge Law, 14 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 387 (1988). Barrett, Wrongful Dismissal
Laws May Feel Effect of Dispute Before Montana's High Court, Wall St. J., Nov. 8, 1988,
at B1, col. 3. See also Dickens, Wrongful-Firing Case in Montana May Prompt Laws in
Other States, Wall St. J., July 3, 1989, at 11, col. 1.
129. Barrett, supra note 126; see also Dickens, supra note 126.
130. The author of the ACLU brief was Henry H. Perritt, Jr., author of one of the
leading employment law textbooks on employee dismissal rights. See H. PERRITT, EMPLOYEE
DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1987).
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Montana has been in the forefront of the development of these
common law theories, this court having articulated one of the
broadest versions of the implied covenant of good faith doctrine..
. .Many commentators have concluded that legislative reform in
the area is necessary to protect the interests of employees, em-
ployers, and the public .... Montana was in the forefront of the
reform movement when it enacted the Wrongful Discharge from
Employment Act .... Unless the decision of the trial court is re-
versed [and the Act upheld], Montana will move from the fore-
front to the background ....'31
In August 1989, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws completed its first reading of a draft Uniform
Employment Termination Act, several provisions of which are
modeled after WDFEA. 132 In Montana, the concerns of employers
and employees were more prosaic: Exactly how was WDFEA going
to operate in the workplace? Several of WDFEA's provisions leave
room for question.
B. Probationary Employees
WDFEA draws a distinction between probationary and non-
probationary employees. The "good cause" provision of WDFEA
defines a discharge as wrongful "if [it] was not for good cause and
the employee had completed the employer's probationary period of
employment .. ".. ,133 "Probationary period," however, is not de-
fined by WDFEA. Rather, WDFEA allows the employer to estab-
lish the length of the probationary period. Thus, probationary pe-
riods may extend from a few weeks, to six months, to several
years.1 3 1 WDFEA appears to keep open the possibility that em-
ployers may adopt a practice or policy of not permitting employees
to attain non-probationary or permanent status. The use of an em-
ployment contract of the type at issue in Prout would do just that.
Such a contract or policy would state that both employer and em-
ployee agree that the employee is in a state of perpetual probation
and may be terminated at any time merely upon notice. The court
131. Amicus Curiae Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union at 1-2, Meech v. Hil-
Ihaven West, Inc., _ Mont. ._, 776 P.2d 488 (1989) (No. 88-410) (available at the Mon-
tana State Library in Helena, Montana).
132. For the text of the draft uniform act see INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE RIGHTS MANUAL
(IERM) 540:51, BNA (1987)
133. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(2) (1989).
134. When WDFEA was under consideration the legislature heard testimony that
some employers had established probationary periods as long as seven years. The desire not
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was very careful to point out in Prout that it was not invalidating
such contracts.135 The WDFEA preamble supports the idea that
such contracts are still allowed. It states: "Except as limited in
[WDFEA], employment having no specified term may be termi-
nated at the will of either the employer or the employee on notice
to the other for any reason considered sufficient by the terminating
party.'
13
Despite the possibility that a probationary period may exist
indefinitely, probationary employees are not left totally unpro-
tected by WDFEA. The prohibition on termination "in retaliation
for the employee's refusal to violate public policy" applies to both
probationary and non-probationary employees.'37 Similarly, proba-
tionary employees are protected by the provision prohibiting dis-
charges in violation of the employer's "own written personnel poli-
cies."' 38 This latter protection may prove to be illusory, however, if
employers insert in their policy manual a waiver similar to the one
used in Prout. WDFEA allows employers a great deal of latitude in
defining the rights of probationary employees. Thus, as long as an
employer's conduct is consistent with the employer's personnel
policies, the only basis for challenging the discharge of a proba-
tionary employee is that the employer discharged the employee in
retaliation for refusing to violate a law or for reporting a violation
of law.
C. Internal Grievance Procedures
WDFEA gives enhanced legal status to employers' internal
grievance procedures. WDFEA requires that a discharged em-
ployee, must first exhaust internal grievance procedures before
that employee may file a lawsuit. 39 However, such exhaustion re-
quired if: 1) "the employer maintains written internal procedures
under which an employee may appeal a discharge," and 2) the em-
ployer notifies the discharged employee of the grievance policy and
supplies a copy of the procedures to the employee within seven
days of the date of discharge.'"
Any employer having an internal grievance procedure would
135. - Mont. at -, 772 P.2d at 292.
136. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-902 (1989). This language seems redundant in light of
the old at-will statute found at MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-503 (1989), which was not repealed
by WDFEA.
137. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1) (1989).
138. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(3) (1989).
139. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-911 (1989).
140. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-911(3) (1989).
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be well advised to state in any notice of discharge: "If you wish to
appeal this decision you must do so under the terms of the at-
tached procedure." The advantages to the employer of such a no-
tice are several. First, the grievance procedure gives the employer a
chance to gather more information and reflect on the initial termi-
nation decision. If the employer becomes convinced that termina-
tion was unwarranted, the decision can be reversed with little or no
legal exposure. Second, internal grievance procedures typically
specify a limited time in which to file grievances, such as ten work-
ing days or maybe thirty calendar days. Therefore, if a discharged
employee does not file a grievance within this short time period,
that employee will be unable to sustain the claim in court.
WDFEA states that an "employee's failure to initiate or exhaust
available internal procedures is a defense to an action [for wrong-
ful discharge]." 14 Finally, the presence of an internal grievance
procedure can reduce the period of uncertainty for an employer
waiting to find out whether a lawsuit will result from a discharge.
The WDFEA's statute of limitation is one year, 2 but for an em-
ployee who chooses not to use an available grievance procedure,
the opportunity to file in court expires when the time limit for fil-
ing an internal grievance expires. Because of these significant ben-
efits for employers, WDFEA will probably spur the development of
written grievance procedures where none existed previously.
D. Arbitration and Fee Shifting
WDFEA sets up an elaborate system designed to channel dis-
charge lawsuits toward arbitration.1 43 WDFEA provides that once a
lawsuit commences, either side has sixty days to request arbitra-
tion and the other side has thirty days to accept. By 'itself, this
provision is no special incentive, because state law generally allows
parties to arbitrate any dispute upon mutual agreement.1 4
4
As noted earlier, however, the incentive to agree to an arbitra-
tion request under WDFEA stems from the fact that failing to ac-
cede to the request ultimately may subject the refusing party to
paying the other side's attorney fees in the ensuing court case,
should the party that tendered the rejected request prevail in the
lawsuit. WDFEA does not authorize attorney fees for litigation
when the parties do not request arbitration. Thus, if parties do not
141. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-911(2) (1989). Once initiated, the grievance procedures
must culminate in 90 days, or the employee is free to proceed to court. Id.
142. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-911(l) (1989).
143. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-914 (1989).
144. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(1) (1989).
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agree to arbitrate under WDFEA, each side must pay its own at-
torney fees under the "American rule" on fees generally followed
in Montana. 14 5 The WDFEA scheme for shifting can be better un-
derstood by examining the following chart.
145. See, e.g., State ex rel. Foss v. District Court, 216 Mont. 327, 334, 701 P.2d 342,
347 (1985), and sources cited therein, including Williams, . . . and Attorneys Fees to the
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The chart clarifies that the only way a discharged employee
with a valid claim can have attorney fees paid is by initially re-
questing arbitration. Once the employee makes such a request, the
employee is assured of receiving attorney fees upon prevailing, re-
gardless of whether the matter goes to arbitration or to court.
On the other hand, if a suing employee allows the employer to
request arbitration, the employee is not entitled to attorney fees,
win or lose. Worse yet, if the employee refuses to go to arbitration
and then loses in court, the employee will end up paying the em-
ployer's attorney fees. A suing employee will have to decide
whether the fee advantages accompanying an arbitration request
outweigh a discharged employee's usual desire to get the matter
before a jury, if in fact a jury trial is available under WDFEA."'4
E. Specific Term Employees
WDFEA "does not apply to a discharge ...of an employee
covered by ...a written contract of employment for a specific
term." 7 Because WDFEA does not apply to such persons, the abo-
lition of common-law employment torts does not apply either. Ac-
cordingly, there are some employees in Montana to whom the cases
from Gates I, to Dare, to Nordlund, and to Prout are more than
just historic artifacts. These cases and their present interpretation
still govern the employment of specific-term employees. Obviously,
once the specific term for which these employees have contracted
expires, the employer has no obligation to renew the contract.'48
However, termination of such individuals in mid-contract could
give rise to a claim for the breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. Therefore, the evolution of employment tort law is
likely to continue in Montana and the Montana Supreme Court
146. WDFEA is silent on whether or not a jury trial is available for litigants. However,
jury trials are generally available as a matter of right to litigants where the issue is a matter
of money damages. See, e.g. 47 AM.JuR. 2D, § 42 (1966) This harks back to the ancient split
between legal and equitable claims, wherein jury trials were available for the former, but not
the latter. Montana has generally followed this dichotomy. See, e.g., Breese v. Steel Moun-
tain Enters., 220 Mont. 454, 716 P.2d 214 (1986). Reinstatement and backpay have generally
been considered equitable damages. Remedies available under WDFEA do not include rein-
statement, so the question of whether a jury trial is available under the Act may turn on
how the monetary damages are characterized.
147. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-912 (1989).
148. See, e.g., Nordlund, supra note 22. In Leland v. Heywood, 197 Mont. 491, 497,
498, 643 P.2d 578, 581, 582 (1982), the court stated that there is a significant legal difference
between a termination and a mere refusal to renew an expiring contract. In Prout the Court
stated that even employers who can terminate for any reason cannot terminate for incorrect
or false reasons. Prout, supra note 47. If this standard were applied to non-renewals the
distinction made in Leland would lose its significance.
1990]
28
Montana Law Review, Vol. 51 [1990], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol51/iss1/3
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
will again be confronted with the pre-eminent issue raised in Gates
II and in Prout: Is an action for breach of the covenant of good
faith a tort, as the majority held in Gates II, or a contract action,
as the dissent argued in Prout? Similarly, the question of whether
the employer is to be judged by an objective or subjective standard
may also resurface in suits brought by specific-term employees ter-
minated during the life of their contracts.
F. Unionized Employees
WDFEA also exempts from its coverage any "employee cov-
ered by a written collective bargaining agreement." 1 9 Just as with
specific-term employees, employees under union contract are not
affected by WDFEA's abolition of common-law causes of action.
The question left unanswered is whether any unionized employees
are in a legal position to pursue a claim for breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing or for a "public policy wrongful dis-
charge," as denominated by the Montana Supreme Court.
In Brinkman, the most thorough examination of the subject,
the court held that a unionized employee could not pursue such a
claim.1"' But in that case, the employee had access to a grievance
procedure with binding arbitration to vindicate his claim. 15 ' The
court's decision dwelt on this fact and it is not clear whether the
same result would apply to a unionized employee under a contract
with a nonexistent or ineffectual grievance procedure.1 52
The Brinkman court also relied on the U.S. Supreme Court
case of Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck.153 In Allis-Chalmers, the
Court held that any state tort action implicating rights granted by
a collective-bargaining agreement was preempted by federal labor
law and must give way to the contractual grievance procedures cre-
ated pursuant to federal law.154 Subsequently, in Lingle v. Norge,
the U.S. Supreme Court backed away from the blanket preemption
position it had taken in Allis-Chalmers.1 55 The Court allowed a un-
ionized worker to bring suit for a retaliatory discharge, even
though the employee could have challenged the discharge through
the negotiated grievance procedure. Moreover, the Court noted it
149. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-912(2) (1989).
150. Brinkman v. State, 224 Mont. 238, 249, 729 P.2d 1301, 1308 (1986).
151. Id. at 241, 729 P.2d at 1303.
152. WDFEA's exemption for unionized employees is absolute as long as a "written
collective bargaining agreement" exists. The exemption does not depend on the presence of
a grievance procedure or on any other contractual provision.
153. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
154. Id. at 219.
155. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988).
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would permit an employee to sue in court on any state law claim
that was "independent" of the negotiated contract:
[E]ven if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining
agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would
require addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the
state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agree-
ment itself, the claim is "independent" of the agreement .... 5s
As a result of Lingle, unionized employees will be able to go
forward with "independent" tort claims. But establishing an inde-
pendent tort claim can not be done in the abstract, so courts must
examine the factual underpinnings of every tort claim that a pri-
vate-sector union employee files, to determine whether it can be
evaluated "independent" of the collective agreement. In the Brink-
man decision, which involved Montana public employees, the court
applied separate state statutory provisions and concluded that or-
ganized Montana public employees could not bring employment
tort actions.157 However, in cases involving private sector employ-
ees, it is unclear whether the Montana Supreme Court disallowed
employment tort claims because of the nature of the state cause of
action or because it felt compelled to follow Allis-Chalmers.15 8 If
the court is merely following Allis-Chalmers, then the combination
of Lingle and the WDFEA exemption create a new opportunity to
argue that suits for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, including public-policy based "wrongful discharge" ac-
tions, are available to private sector employees who are organized.
G. Public Employees and the Immunity Doctrine
Prior to 1987, when the legislature adopted WDFEA, public
employees had the ability to bring an employment tort against
their employer in the same manner as private-sector employees. 159
156. Id. at 1887.
157. See, e.g., the court's reliance on the language of the state public employees bar-
gaining act as creating the kind of "objective manifestations," referred to in Dare, thereby
negating any claim for breach of the covenant of good faith. Brinkman, 224 Mont. at 250,
729 P.2d at 1309 (citing Dare, 212 Mont. at 282, 687 P.2d at 1020).
158. In Smith v. Montana Power Co., 225 Mont. 166, 170, 731 P.2d 924, 926 (1987),
the court said its holding was "required by Allis-Chalmers," but then noted special features
from Brinkman that would support the same result even in the absence of any federal
mandate.
159. School teachers are in a unique situation because the state statute already lays
out a detailed scheme for terminating teachers and for appeallingf such decisions. See
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 20-3-107, 20-3-210, 20-4-204, and 20-4-207 (1989). Final decisions in
this process are subject to judicial review under the Montana Administrative Procedures
Act. These statutes were a formidable barrier for teachers suing for breach of the covenant
of good faith. WDFEA does not expressly exclude teachers, but the specificity of the codes
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In fact, several good faith cases, such as Nye, Nordlund, and
Belcher, have involved public employees. However, in the 1988
case of Bieber v. Broadwater County,16 0 the court rejected a pre-
WDFEA good faith claim brought by a terminated county em-
ployee."' The court declared that employment decisions involving
county employees are legislative acts and, therefore, are covered by
the statute granting immunity for the legislative acts of govern-
mental entities.1 62 In Bieber, an elected county commissioner ter-
minated the employee and the discharge was subsequently ap-
proved by the entire commission. 6 The court disallowed the suit
and declared that the individual commissioner, the commission it-
self, and the county were all protected by the immunity statute. 6
Less than a year later, in Peterson v. Great Falls School Dis-
trict No. 1,165 the court expanded the scope of public immunity to
cover the pre-WDFEA termination of a public employee by a
nonelected administrator who was acting on behalf of a school
board.' Even though the school district was the only named de-
fendant, the court held that the administrator, the school board,
and the school district were all protected by the immunity
statute.
67
Bieber and Peterson put much of local government employ-
ment outside the reach of a suit for breach of the employer's duty
of good faith and fair dealing.' It is not clear whether WDFEA
has the effect of waiving this newly developed immunity for em-
ployment termination suits. Although WDFEA has no exclusion
for public employers and employees, it does not specifically cover
them, either. A general rule of statutory construction followed in
many states, including Montana, is that unless a statute specifi-
cally addresses a group, that group will fail to obtain the statute's
protections:
governing them would seem to rule out any WDFEA suits by teachers.
160. 232 Mont. 487, 759 P.2d 145 (1988).
161. Id. at 493-95, 759 P.2d at 150-53.
162. The statute being construed was MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-111 (1985), which re-
mains unamended yet today.
163. Bieber, 232 Mont. at 488-89, 759 P.2d at 149-50.
164. Id. at 493-95, 759 P.2d at 150-53.
165. - Mont. __, 773 P.2d 316 (1989). In both Bieber and Peterson, the employee
was terminated before WDFEA was enacted, but the cases did not reach the Montana Su-
preme Court until later.
166. Peterson, - Mont. at -, 773 P.2d at 317-18.
167. Id.
168. In Mitchell v. University of Montana, - Mont. -, 783 P.2d 1337 (1989), the
Montana Supreme Court refused to extend statutory legislative immunity to the Montana
University System. This decision makes it unlikely that state executive branch agencies can
partake of the Bieber style immunity.
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The government, whether federal or state, and its agencies are
not ordinarily to be considered as within the purview of a statute,
however general and comprehensive the language of act may be,
unless intention to include them is clearly manifest, as where they
are expressly named therein, or included by necessary
implication."'
Thus, if a court applies this rule of construction to WDFEA,
the result appears to be that government employees may not bring
suit under WDFEA. Moreover, local government employees are
prohibited from bringing common-law employment tort actions by
Bieber and Peterson. On the other hand, if WDFEA is understood
as covering governmental employees, then the immunity existing
by virtue of Bieber and Peterson has been waived by the legisla-
ture. Any waiver of immunity found in WDFEA would necessarily
be an implied waiver, because the 1987 Montana Legislature could
not have knowingly waived an immunity that did not exist at the
time and was not clearly articulated by the court until 1988.170
VI. CONCLUSION
Twice during the 1980s Montana employment law has been
convulsed. For most Montana employees, the applicable law is now
that established by WDFEA. However, for significant numbers of
employees, the operative law is determined by either a collective-
bargaining agreement or an individual employment contract. For
these employees, the evolving legal doctrines surrounding the
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing still have primary
importance.
169. State ex rel City of Livingston v. State Water Conservation Bd.. 134 Mont. 403,
408, 332 P.2d 913, 916 (1958) (citing 82 C.J.S. § 317 (1953)). See also C. SANDS, 3 SUTHER-
LAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 62.01 (4th ed. 1984).
170. Absent WDFEA, governmental employers will have an additional immunity argu-
ment if the court ever reverses itself and determines that breach of the implied covenant of
good faith is a contract action rather than a tort action. Under the recent case of Peretti v.
State, - Mont. __, 777 P.2d 329 (1989), the state is liable only for express contracts and
is immune against actions based on an implied contract.
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